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____________________________________ 
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Pro se appellant James Carson, Jr., appeals from an order granting summary 
judgment to the defendant.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 With the assistance of counsel, Carson filed a complaint against Detective Jessica 
Aurand, the Mifflin County Regional Police Department, Mifflin County, and several 
John Doe defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various state laws.  After Mifflin 
County moved to dismiss the complaint, Carson filed an amended complaint naming only 
Aurand and “John Does 1-10,” and claiming malicious prosecution under the Fourth 
Amendment and state law.  Aurand is the Department’s only police detective. 
Carson’s claims arose from his prosecution for the alleged sexual assault of his 
minor niece, “S.W.,” who lived with Carson and his girlfriend for several weeks in 2013.  
The following year, S.W. disclosed to Dauphin County Children and Youth Services 
(“DCCYS”) that she had been sexually assaulted.  She contacted DCCYS on three 
separate occasions, identifying first her father, then her mother, and then Carson as her 
abusers.  In January 2015, Mifflin County Children and Youth Services (“MCCYS”) sent 
a report to Aurand describing S.W.’s allegations and naming Carson as the alleged 
perpetrator.  Aurand initiated an investigation.  Thereafter, MCCYS conducted a medical 
examination of S.W.—which revealed no evidence of an assault or previous 




which S.W. made several statements that identified Carson by name and described the 
alleged incident in detail. 
Carson was arrested in March 2015 pursuant to a warrant obtained by Aurand.  He 
was charged with Rape of a Child, Statutory Sexual Assault, Involuntary Deviate Sexual 
Intercourse, and Aggravated Indecent Assault on a Child, but he was acquitted of all 
charges.  He subsequently sued Aurand, alleging malicious prosecution.  Aurand moved 
for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that that she was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  The District Court granted Aurand’s motion, reasoning that 
because Aurand had probable cause to arrest Carson that there was no constitutional 
violation, and, besides, that Aurand was immune from suit.1  Carson appealed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the District Court.  See Blunt v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  Summary judgment is proper if, 
viewing the record in the light most favorable to Carson, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and Aurand is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a); Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009).  Aurand is entitled to 
 
1 The District Court also terminated the John Doe defendants from the case, noting that 
discovery had not revealed any additional defendants.  We will not review this ruling 
because Carson does not challenge it on appeal.  See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d 





judgment as a matter of law if Carson failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential 
element of his case.  See Holloway v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 948 F.3d 164, 168 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2020). 
III.  
To make a claim for malicious prosecution under both federal and state law, 
Carson must show, among other things, that Aurand initiated the proceeding against him 
without probable cause.  See Allen v. N.J. State Police, 974 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(federal law); Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 791 (3d Cir. 2000) (state 
law).  Because the undisputed evidence shows that Aurand had probable cause to arrest 
Carson, his malicious prosecution claim fails. 
Probable cause “exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting 
officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe 
that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”  Merkle, 211 
F.3d at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted).  A plaintiff arrested on a valid warrant2 
must make two showings to challenge probable cause: (1) that the officer, with at least a 
reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions in the warrant 
application, and (2) that those statements or omissions were necessary to the finding of 
probable cause.  See Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 




Carson’s argument that Aurand’s investigation was unconstitutional because it 
was limited to her interview with S.W. is unavailing.  “When a police officer has received 
a reliable identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable cause 
to arrest.”  Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other 
grounds by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2007).  Thus, S.W.’s identification of 
Carson was sufficient to provide probable cause.  See Aurand Dep., ECF No. 32-6 at 25–
26 (explaining that Aurand believed S.W. to be credible). 
Moreover, the record evidence shows that Aurand made no reckless or material 
factual omissions in obtaining the arrest warrant.  During the preliminary hearing, she 
admitted that her investigation consisted solely of her observation of S.W.’s interview, 
despite knowing about S.W.’s medical examination.  See ECF No. 36-5 at 14.  Aurand 
stated in her deposition that, in her professional experience, it is not uncommon for 
children (who heal faster than adults) to show no signs of sexual abuse upon examination, 
especially when the exam is conducted more than a year past the date of the alleged 
abuse.  See, e.g., ECF No. 32-6 at 24–25.  Thus, she considered the medical examination 
to be inconclusive, rather than exonerating, evidence.  This interpretation was 
corroborated by the medical examiner.  See ECF No. 46 at 99–100. 
Carson’s other arguments are likewise without merit.  The facts that Carson was 
arrested without DNA evidence, that Aurand did not speak to certain witnesses, and that 




reasonable belief that he had committed the alleged offense.  Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 
71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that “for Fourth Amendment purposes, the 
issue is not whether the information on which police officers base their request for an 
arrest warrant resulted from a professionally executed investigation; rather, the issue is 
whether that information would warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense 
has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested”).  Nor does the record 
support Carson’s assertions that Aurand stated under oath that she knew that he was 
innocent before arresting him and that the Mifflin County Police Department sent him a 
“threatening letter.”  Carson Br. at 2.3 
IV. 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
3 Because we agree with the District Court that Carson’s claim is meritless, we need not 
reach the question whether Aurand is protected by qualified immunity. 
